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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

Case No. 7945

ln the Matter of the Estate

PETITION FOR

of

REHEARING on
EMMA G. BUTTARS,
Deceased.

behalf of Contestants and Appellants.

Appeal from the District Court of Cache County, Utah
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Respectfully subtnitted,
George C. Heinrich
Attorney for Contestants and Appelants.
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Point No. 1. After stating in the opinion rendered under date of Sept.,
26, 1953, that this is a law case, the court nevertheless in the last two
paragraphs of its opinion sets out testimony of respondent and weighs
it against testiinony of appellant, thus clearing invading; the function
of the jury.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Case No. 7945

In the Matter of the Estate

PETITION FOR

of

REHEARING on
·EMMA G. BUTTARS,

behalf of Contest-

Deceased.

ants and Appellants.

Comes now the contestants and appellants herein and
hereby petition the above Honorable Court for a rehearing
for the following reasons and grounds upon which it is
most respectfully submitted the court erred, to-wit:ARGUMENT
Point No. 1: After stating in the opinion rendered
under date of Sept., 26, 1953, that this is a law
case, the court nevertheless in the last two paragraphs of its opinion sets out testimony of respondent and weighs it against testimony of appellant,
thus clearing invading the function of the jury.
It is indisputable that in re Hanson's Will, 50 Utah,
207, 167 Pac. 256, In re Hanson's Estate, 87 Utah 580, 52
Pac. 2d 1103, and in re Swan's Estate, 51 Utah 410, 170
Pac. 452, all hold that whether or not a testator was of
sound and disposing mind is a law case and so a question
of fact for the jury upon competent evidence, and that
3
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these cases prescribe and define what sort of evidence is
admissable. In fact, in the Swan case, supra, at page 457
left-hand column, this court says:
"As before stated, if there is any substantial evidence
to support the findings, our duty becomes fixed and
absolute, no matter how much or what kind of evidence there may be on 'the other side."
It is submitted that the two last concluding paragraphs of the opinion written in the face of evidence in the
record flatly contradictory and which the court apparently
entirely ignored. The statement that the "uncontradicted
testimony of friends, neighbors and trademen was that
their contacts with testatrix even after her illnesses she
always appeared nea~ and understood what she was talking about" etc. is not a fact. Evidence in direct conflict
to this statement was given by Melvin, a son, who at aU
times knew his mother inti:mately, and by her daughters,
~.fargaret and Maybell, both of whom lived close-by, visited with their mother often, assisted in her care, who were
literally at all times in and out of her home and all of whom
observed their mother's every change both mentally and
physically over the years.. In fact, Melvin, in great detail
recited and described the failing condition of his mother's
health from her first _illness through her second illness
both of which occured before she signed her so-called
will, then gave it as his opinion that his mother's mental
condition was one of incompetence, even on the date the
will was signed, and both of his sisters, Margaret and Maybell, in substance gave the same conclusion. A mere cursory examination of the testimony of such "friends and
neighbors" who testified, being Dave Sparks, Bishop Raveston, S. Goodey, and Mrs. Thompson, will show that their
testimony was very unsatisfactory and very little left of
it after cross-examination. A jury could hardly be expected to follow such testimony as against the other positive
testin1ony just mentioned given on behalf of the children
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of deceased. The opinion then further stated "and that
the ·doctor who attended her testified that in his opinion
she was competent during all time except in ~larch, 1952."'
It is submitted that the doctor's testimony is the flimsiest
of all and his testimony is respectfully referred to. Such
a statement on the part of the doctor cannot be correct because he only saw the de9eased occasionally. He knew
absolutely nothing about her condition when the will was
executed. Then, too, his testimony was flatly contradicted by Melvin, Margaret and Maybell, and the jury could
if they preferred accept their testimony rather than that
of the doctor according to the specific holding. in the
Swan case, supra. At any rate, this is another conflict in
the testimony which this court ignored in its opinion,
thus overriding the verdict of the jury on substantial evidence in conflict which the jury had a right to resolve.
Two "trademen" testified on behalf of proponents, Mrs.
Allen of Logan and a Mr. Bowles a linament salesman.
The linament salesman saw the deceased periodically and
so could know very little about her; and his testimony is
also contradicted. ~1rs. Allen, also saw deceased very infrequently, and in fact her testimony reveals that she did
not even know deceased very well. The deceased at most
In this
was a very casual and infrequent customer.
that she did not even know deceased very well. In this
connection it is a singular fact that the last time deceased
was in Mrs. Allen's. store she was accompanied by her
daughters Maybell and Archulius and went to the store
to purchase. a dress to attend to her deceased son, Ira's,
funeral, and then she had forgotten entirely that her son
had died. If testimony was desired on the part of tradesInen, then it may appropriately be asked, why did not
proponents obtain the testimony of the general storekeeper
at Clarkston, where the record shows most of the groceries, ·etc. were purchased? The obvious answer is as stated
by contestants, deceased's condition was such that they did
not want it generally known and that she stayed in the
hon1e. At an~' rate, the a hove shows that there ,,,·as a

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

very decided conflict in the testimony, all of which this
court also entirely overlooked so far as can be ascertained
fron1 its opinion because there is no mention made of it
anywhere. Hereafter, petitioner will refer to the testimony of the subscribing witnesses to the will mentioned
in the last paragraph of its opinion.
POINT NO. 2: The court in its opinion not only invaded the province of the jury in weighing the evidence, but it also entirely overlooked from its consideration a great quantity of evidence produced upon
the trial for the consideration of the jury, none of
which is referred to in its opinion.
In its opinion, this Honorable Court gives the following quote fro;m In re Hanson's Estate, 87 Utah 580,
52 Pac. 2d, 1103:
"A person may not be capable of conducting ordinary
business because not. trained in it or even if incapable
mentally may in cases be capable of making a simple
will. The true test is as to whether the testatrix had
sufficient mind and memory at the time of making the
will to remember who were the natural objects of her
bounty, recall to mind her property, and dispose of it
understandingly according to some plan formed in
her mind."
Following this the court cites In re Swan's estate,
supra. It is significant that the Swan case states that
when a will is made by a person who has reached the age
of upwards of eighty years and it is shown that the usual
infirmities of old age such as hardening of the arteries
and consequet loss of memory, etc., have supervened, the
question of whether the testator possessed the legal capacity to make a will at the time of its execution is never free
from difficulty and is nearly always shrouded more or less
in doubt. The opinion just handed down by this court
recognizes that the deceased was of the age of eighty
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years when she executed her so-called will and that when
she was _seventy-five years of age she became very ill and
hospitalized and was suffering from kidney troubles, high
blood pressure and hardening of the arteries, and that her
memory became poorer and that gradual dterioration continued to the very day of her death. Such, it is submitted
is the very situation prevailing in the Swan case, supra, and
the theory upon which the case at bar was tried and upon
which facts the jury decided the issues in favor of contestant.
Now applying the evidence to the last quote: The
Swan case holds that it is the duty of the subscribing witnesses not only to witness the signature of testatrix, but
they must also pass on her testamenty capacity. At the
outset it must be remembered that this so-called will was
made within 30 days after the death of her eldest son,
David, and whose death Emma G. Buttars could not fully
realize.
The two witnesses in the case at bar were the attorney who
drew the will and his stenographer. Neither ever saw
Emma G. Buttars be~ore. She was only in the office not
more than 30 minutes at the very most. She had been
brought there by her son Wallace, who ~1elvin testified
simply "led his mother around." The only time the stenographer was in Mrs. Buttars presence was when the attorney dictated the will and then when she returned the
typewritten copy. Preparation of the will was a hurriedup affair. The attorney did not remember much of anything about her according to his own testimony. He did
not even remember whether or not she had with her a
memorandum to recall who the natural objects of her
bounty were. The record of both of these witnesses is respectfully referred to. Admittedly neither of then1 kne\v
n1uch about her. The jury could well ha\'e concluded
that these \Vitnesses did not pass upon her testatnentarv
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capacity, or if they did, that their testimony taken in connection with the other testimony as to the mental condition
of deceased, they disagreed with the judgment of the witnesses to the will, a~. they had a right to do under the
Swan case, supra. At ap.y rate here was another conflict
which the jury had a right to and did resolve against the
validity of the will. Nor is this a case where any one ever
considered Emma G. Buttars as an eccentric person. Her
whole life and the whole record before this court is exactly
to the contrary. The whole picture presented by the
record is that before her illnesses she was a resolute determined person, lool<ed after her affairs, with a will of
her own and a strong believer that everybody should earn
what they received, and that each of her children should
be treated equally, even Wallace and Hattie testified to
this. In fact, from the time of the death of her husband
and during all the times she was in good health she never
distributed or gave anything to any of her children. But
after she became ill, it affected her, her condition worsened and worsened to the very day of her death. She was
never the same herself again according to all of her children who testified for contestants. Gradual deterioration
had set in and continued on so that at the time of the
execution of her will, and after, she was never in full possession and control of her faculties. It is again submitted
earnestly that the case is in all respects similar and parallel with the facts in the Swan case, supra. and that it is
not the case of a person eccentrix in her actions and forgetful at ti1nes of some things as stated in the last paragraph of the court's opinion, nor is such a contention anywhere mentioned in the entire record. And the jury upon
a very sharp and substantial conflict in the testimony decided otherwise.
As to "recall to mind her property." Even attorney
Daines said she did not dicuss her property with him.
There is therefore no evidence at all on the part of propon-
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ents that she fulfilled this requirement for making a will,
that she was able to "recall to mind her property." On
the other hand, contestants' testimony is positive. ~I elvin
testified that she did not know what she had, worried about income or enough to live on when she in fact had
plenty, and that she did not know her property from that
of others. The further testimony as to her condition with
reference to this point is that all of her children, Oriso~1
(now deceased) Wallace, Hattie, Melvin, Maybell, ~lar
garet and Gover, called a meeting because her mental
and physical condition was such that she could not be left
alone. They did not even want her condition known. So
they did not want a guardian appointed. She did not go
out of the house, and she did not even know that her
daught~rs were being paid for caring for her out of her
own money. She sold one tract of land to Archulius for
$500.00, one fourth its real value. Gave Thatcher Bros.
Bank stock (now First Security Stock) to Archulius because, as stated in a memo, that the stock Archulius had
received from her father's estate proved eventually to be
worthless, and then for the same reason gave Archulius a
48 acre tra·ct of land, and then Archulius said, and it is not
denied by her, that she might just as well have had the
160 acre tract instead of just the 48 acre tract. Is not
such testimony more reliable and trustworthy than that of
"friends, neighbors, trademen" or even that of "the doctor" and surely does it not show lack of capacity to 1nake
a will? Small wonder attorney Daines testified that she
did not discuss her property with him. The plain truth
of the matter is that she could not comprehend her property at the time of execution of her will, and the jury
after a three day trial so concluded she could not, and the
jury's verdict is supported by an abundance of evidence.
The jury's verdict should be upheld by this court.
And the next requirement of the above quote is: "and
dispose of it (the property) understandingly according
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to some plan formed in her mind". Let us now take a
look as to how this requirement has been fulfilled according to the evidence in the record. Undeniably, the record
shows deceased had and accumulated considerable property at the time she made her so-called will; that from
the date of the death of her husband to the time of making
her will, March 22, 1945, she disposed of none of it, and
that she always said, even in her will, that her children
shall all be treated alike. It certainly cannot be disputed
that the record is replete with evidence that at the time
of making her will she could not "recall to mind her property;,, some of which evidence is alluded in the preceeding paragraph ..
In the second paragraph of her will, she gives her
grandchildren, the children of one of ·her very fondest son
who was deceased, and of all of whom she could be very
proud because they had each and every one of them, the
grandsons, either served honorably in the Armed Forces,
fuHilled a mission, or in some instances both, each the
sum of $1.00, because she had loaned to her deceased
son the sum of $1500.00 twenty-seven years prior when
there is evidence to the effect that the loan had been repaid, and so marked by deceased herself (Cont. Ex. 1)
that never once did any one, not even Wallace, ever hear
his mother ever say that her deceased son Daniel was
owing anything and in the face of undisputable evidence
that Daniel was doing well at all times financially. The
mortgage security itself had never even been recorded
It must certainly be plain that deceased would not have
left her son Daniel, or his heirs, out for any other reason
except the notion that he was still indebted when he was
not. From such testimony in the record which the jury
listened to closely for three full days, can it be said that
the deceased /:'understandingly'' made the bequest contained in this second paragraph? The jury no boubt decided this otherwise.
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And in the next paragraph ( 3) she directed that the
rest, residue and remainder of her estate be given in equal
shares to the remainder of her children; and in the fifth
paragraph she named Wallace as executor, so to serve
without giving bond. · This statement that she wanted
~o treat all of her children 4:4:equally" or "alike" is in keeping with what she said all her life, but it is submitted that
when the statement was made in the will it amounted
to nothing more nor less than a bare statement, because
by this time, after two serious illnesses, her mental and
physical condition in the language contained Inre Swan's
Estate, was such that it must have caused the jury to inquire into deceased's "lost memory" ond to inquire, 'now
far the faculty of understanding has lost its original
strenght and vigor as regards those facts of personal history
of testator, which enter into and form a part of the planning and execution of a rational, fair, and just testament".
·How ccunderstandingly" Emma G. Buttars formed this plan
is answerved by the fact that commencing six days after
the execution of a so~called plan (her will) she conveyed
one 60 acre tract of land to Wallace, for which purpose
he brought her to Logan, that on April 9, 1945, she gave
bonds and stocks of considerable value to Hattie and
Archulius because, as she says, (and this was after doing
nothing about it from 1917 to 1945) stocks distributed to
them out of their father's estate eventually turned out to
be of no value, and then for the same reason gave Archulius a 48 acre tract of land. See the brief of appellants
for a list of the transfers and convevances, as a result of
which :within beginning within six days after deceased was
supposed to have decided to have formed a plan to "dispose of it (her property) understandinglt! according to
some plan formed in her mind"", for no explainable reason
on earth other than the result of her own failure of health
by reason of her advanced age and the iinpact of her illnesses, she favored Wallace and Archulius "'ith substantial
preferences, Wallace getting n1ore than Archulins and
.I
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Archulius getting more than Hattie, and all three of these
being favored over the other children. So that within a
few days after "understandingly'' willing her estate according to a plan formed, equal to her children, the socalled plan became unequal and unjust to a shameful
degree, and it is submitted in a way that Emma G. Buttars
never for a moment would have permitted had she been
her real former self. Nothing was left of her will except
to dispose of what was left and to permit Wallace to act
as executor in doing this. The writer of this brief earnestly contends that this action on the part of deceased viewed
in the light of the testimony of the condition of the deceased at the time she executed her so-called will, cannot be
dismissed in the language of this court contained in the
paragraph, "and that after she made her will she disposed
of a good portion of her property after a liftime of careful
saving is no proof that at the time of making her will she
lacked testamentary capacity", and that in view of all of
the evidence, conflicting and otherwise, which the jury
had the right to resolve, that "The court therefore did not
err in admitting the will to probate in view of the complete
lack of evidence that at the time of making the will testatrix lacked the mind to understand what she was doing".
Such a statement completly ignores evidence produced
on the part of contestants. Finally, it is seriously urged
that a grave injustice will result if this will is permitted
to stand, one that testatrix would not herself permit it
if she could help herself. If such a will is permitted to
stand, then older people and their heirs are helpless to
protect them.
WHEREFORE, contestants submit that the decision
rendered by this court is upon its face in error in that it
weighs the testimony of proponents against that of the
contestants, contrary to the authorities cited therein, that
it omits from its consideration entirely substantial conflicting evidence given by contestants, and that the decision
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is otherwise in error for the reasons given in thie petition
and the brief of contestants referred to herein which renders its judgment approving and sustaing the lower court
and setting aside the verdict of the jury highly inequitable
and unjust, and so earnestly and seriously request a rehearing and reconsideration of the entire cause based on both
the facts and the law applicable thereto; that such request
in indeed in all respects similar to a like request made and
granted in re Swan's Estate, supra, and which resulted upon further consideration of this court in an opinion upholding the trier of the facts based upon evidence almost identical to that produced in the case at bar.

Respectfully submitted,
George C. Heinrich
Attorney for Contestants and Appelants.
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